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Equitable Prescription Drug Coverage: Preventing
Sex Discrimination in Employer-Provided Health
Plans
Stephen F. Befort*
Elizabeth C. Borer**
INTRODUCTION

Jennifer Erickson spent more than $300 a year out of pocket on
birth control pills because her employer excluded contraceptives
from its self-insured health plan.' Ms. Erickson, a twenty-six year
old pharmacist at the Bartell Drug Company, also frequently had to
inform her customers that their insurance would not pay for their
contraceptive prescriptions either.2 She watched as many women
simply gave up their prescriptions because they could not afford
the out-of-pocket expense. 3 Frustrated by the unequal coverage of
prescriptions for men and women, 4 Ms. Erickson turned to Planned
Parenthood of Western Washington for help.5 Erickson and
Planned Parenthood eventually filed a lawsuit against Bartell,
alleging violations of Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA).6 In the first court ruling on the issue of
gender equity in prescription contraceptive drug coverage, a
Copyright 2009, by STEPHEN F. BEFORT & ELIZABETH C. BORER.

Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty, & Bennett Professor of Law, University of
Minnesota Law School.
** J.D. 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; Associate, Best &
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1. Tamar Lewin, Company's Insurance Should Pay for Contraceptives,
Suit Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2000, at A16.
2. Id. (quoting Ms. Erickson: "Every single day, I'm processing
prescriptions and telling women that their pills aren't covered. Sometimes, they
walk away from the counter and say they can't afford it. It really makes you sad,
and then you realize your own company doesn't cover it either.").
3. Id.
4. Many health insurance plans excluded contraception but covered Viagra
and other male-specific prescription drugs. See Christopher G. Kuhn, An EPICC
Oversight: Why the Current Battle for Access to Contraception Will Not Help
Reduce Unintended Pregnancy in the U.S., 17 HEALTH MATRIX 347, 355
(2007); Lee Korland, Note, Sex Discriminationor a Hard Pillfor Employers to
Swallow: Examining the Denial of Contraceptive Benefits in the Wake of
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 53 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 531, 531-32 (2002).
5. Sarah Schafer, Judge OrdersFirm to Cover Birth Control, WASH. POST,
June 13, 2001, at EO1.
6. Id.
*
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federal judge in Seattle held that Bartell discriminated against
women by excluding prescription contraceptives from its employee
health plan.7
Six years later, the Eighth Circuit-the only federal court of
appeals to consider the application of the PDA to employer
exclusions of insurance coverage for contraception-reached the
opposite conclusion in In re Union Pacific RailroadEmployment
Practices Litigation (Union Pacific) when it held that the lack of
contraception coverage in an employee health insurance plan did
not violate the PDA.' Emphasizing the purpose of the PDA, the
Planned Parenthood attorney who represented the plaintiffs,
Roberta Riley, noted: "It's shocking that this court says that
contraception isn't related to pregnancy, since if it weren't for
pregnancy, contraception wouldn't exist. It's also shocking that the
plan covers Rogaine, for men's baldness,
and Viagra, for
9
impotence, but not birth control pills."
The Eighth Circuit's Union Pacific opinion is not likely the
definitive answer to the question of whether the PDA prohibits
employers from excluding prescription contraceptives from
otherwise comprehensive health plans. Indeed, federal district
courts across the country are currently split as to whether the PDA
requires coverage of prescription contraceptives. 10 Over two-thirds
of women of child-bearing age in the United States depend on
private health insurance, primarily provided through employersponsored health plans, for their health care, and nearly half of

7. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1271 (W.D. Wash.
2001) ("Having reviewed the legislative history of Title VII and the PDA, the
language of the statute itself, and the relevant case law, the Court finds that
Bartell's exclusion of prescription contraception from its prescription plan is
inconsistent with the requirements of federal law.").
8. See In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936
(8th Cir. 2007).
9. Tamar Lewin, Court Says Health Coverage May Bar Birth-Control
Pills,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2007, at Al.
10. Compare Stocking v. AT&T Co., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1016-17 (W.D.
Mo. 2006) (holding that the PDA requires coverage of contraception), and
Mauldin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 01-2755, 2002 WL 2022334, at *19
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 2002) (certifying class of female employees alleging that
Wal-Mart's lack of coverage for prescription contraception violated the PDA),
and Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1270-71 (W.D. Wash.
2001) (holding that the PDA requires coverage of contraception), with Cummins
v. Illinois, No. 02-4201, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42634, at *1-2, *28 (S.D. Ill.
Aug. 30, 2005) (excluding contraception does not violate the PDA), and
Alexander v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 02-252, 2002 WL 731815, at *3-4 (N.D.
Tex. Apr. 22, 2002) (dismissed, holding that the PDA does not require providing
contraception).
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I
large group plans do not cover prescription contraceptives.
Prescription contraceptives create a considerable expense for
millions of American women and their families. 12 Women pay an
estimated sixty-three to sixty-eiht percent more than men in outand the cost of prescription14
of-pocket health care costs,
share of this disparity.
largest
the
represents
contraceptives
Accordingly, working women likely will continue to challenge the
exclusion15 of prescription contraception in courts across the
country.
Meanwhile, twenty-three states have enacted statutes that
mandate the inclusion of prescription contraceptives in group
health plans.' 6 These state mandates, however, have a limited reach
due to the effect of preemption under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), 17 which insulates self-insured plans
from state regulation.18 These statutes in addition, are far from
uniform in terms of their requirements. I9
This Article proposes a two-part strategy for expanding the
availability of prescription contraceptives in employer-sponsored
health plans. First, employers that exclude prescription
contraceptives from employee health insurance plans should be
held to violate Title VII, as amended by the PDA. Such a violation
occurs because the failure to provide insurance coverage for
prescription contraceptives necessarily affects a sex-related
medical condition since only women can become pregnant. This
Article additionally urges the adoption of an amendment to

11. Kuhn, supra note 4, at 352.
12. Sheila Bapat, Comment, FightingCollectivelyfor ContraceptiveEquity:
Class Action Litigation and Emerging Labor Union Supportfor Contraceptive
Coverage, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 951, 952 (2007).
13. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr.
2d 176, 182 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) ("Almost 5 million privately-insured women
between the ages of 14 and 44 have out-of-pocket health expenditures exceeding
10 percent of their income.").
14. Recent Case, Eighth Circuit Holds that Benefits Plans Excluding All
ContraceptivesDo Not DiscriminateBased on Sex, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1447, 1454
(2008) (citing Catholic Charitiesof Sacramento,Inc., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182).
15. This paper focuses exclusively on the discriminatory impact of
employer health plans and does not address the financial or health consequences
for uninsured women. For a discussion of these impacts on uninsured women,
see Kuhn, supra note 4, at 367-74.
16. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
18. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 182-185 and accompanying text.
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ERISA 2-the Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive
Coverage Act (EPICC)-which would mandate all group health
plans to include prescription coverage as a matter of federal law.
Such an enactment would serve to require prescription
contraceptive coverage in both insurance-based and self-insured
employer health plans.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the
statutory foundations of Title VII and the PDA. Part II analyzes
recent cases considering the legality of contraceptive exclusions
from employer-provided health plans and ultimately advocates for
judicial adoption of Judge Bye's dissenting opinion from the
Eighth Circuit's Union Pacific majority holding. Part III considers
mandated health benefit legislation and supports the adoption of
the proposed federal EPICC legislation, which would require
comprehensive employer health plans to cover prescription
contraceptives.
I. STATUTORY PROTECTIONS: TITLE VII AND THE PREGNANCY
DISCRIMINATION ACT

In 1964, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
prohibiting employment discrimination based on race, color,
national origin, religion, and sex. 2 1 The inclusion of sex
discrimination in the Act was an eleventh-hour addition.22 While
legislators debated the bill on the House floor, Howard W. Smith
of Virginia, a devoted opponent of civil rights legislation, proposed
to add the word "sex" to the bill in order "to prevent discrimination
against another minority group, the women." 23 Representative
Smith's suggestion stimulated several hours of laughter-filled
debate, later enshrined as "Ladies Day in the House," before the
amendment passed by a vote of 168 to 133.24
A sweeping remedial response to the problems of employment
discrimination in the United States, the Civil Rights Act also
20 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§
1001-1461, establishes reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibilities with
respect to pension and employee welfare benefit plans.
21. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17); see also Alice A. Reuter, Comment,
Subtle But Pervasive:DiscriminationAgainst Mothers and Pregnant Women in

the Workplace, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1369, 1374-75 (2006) (summarizing the
development of legislative protections for working women).
22.

See Jo Freeman, How "Sex" Got into Title VII: PersistentOpportunism

as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 163, 163 (1991).
23. See 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964); Freeman, supra note 22, at 163.
24. Freeman, supra note 22, at 163.
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established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) as an administrative enforcement body.2 Charged with
investigating claims of discrimination made under Title VII, 26 the
EEOC also has the authority to sue employers allegedly engaged in
discriminatory conduct 27 and to provide interpretative guidance on
Title VII. 28 Initially, the EEOC refused to enforce Title VII claims
of sex discrimination because the agency considered the inclusion
of "sex" in the Act a "fluke." 29 Nevertheless, one-third of the
complaints filed with the EEOC during its first year charged sex
discrimination, 30 and the widespread problem of gender
discrimination in the workplace could no longer be ignored. In
2008, more than 28,000 charges of sex-based discrimination were
filed with the EEOC. 3 '
A. DiscriminationBased on Pregnancy,Motherhood,and Childcare
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against
any individual with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or
32
privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex."
Early Title VII cases invalidated state laws prohibiting women
from employment in certain jobs.33 Courts later used Title VII to
establish sexual harassment as sex-based discrimination in the
workplace. 34 Recognizing pregnancy discrimination as a form of
sex discrimination proved more challenging for working women.
In a significant step toward remedying discrimination based on
pregnancy and motherhood, the United States Supreme Court
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2006) (creating the EEOC and establishing its
powers).
26. See id. § 2000e-6.
27. See id. § 2000e-5.

28. See id. § 2000e-12.
29.

Freeman, supra note 22, at 164.

30. 5 EEOC ANN. REP. 30 (1971).
31. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Sex-Based Charges,
FY 1997 Through 2008, http.//www.eeoc.gov/stats/sex.html (last visited Oct. 11,
2009) (reporting the receipt of 28,372 sex-based charges of discrimination during
fiscal year 2008).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).

33. See Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235-36 (5th Cir.
1969) (invalidating laws designed to "protect" women by prohibiting them from
working in jobs viewed as dangerous for women); see also Keri Phillips, Note,
Resurrecting Gilbert: Facial Parity as Unequal Treatment in the Eighth
Circuit's In Re Union Pacific Railroad Employment Practices Litigation, 31
HAMLINE

L. REv. 309, 326 (2008).

34. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (holding that
adverse action against an employee for refusal to engage in a sexual relationship
with a supervisor constituted sex-based discrimination).
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recognized the viability of "sex-plus" claims. 35 Sex-plus claims
recognize discrimination against women who are treated
disparately, not only because of gender, but also because of an
additional characteristic such as weight or marital status.36 In
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., the Supreme Court held that
treating mothers with pre-school aged children differently than
fathers, without proof of a bona fide occupational qualification,
7
constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.
Despite the recognition of some sex-plus claims, the Court
initially held that pregnancy discrimination was not based on sex.
In Gedulig v. Aiello, six Justices ruled that California's failure to
insure the risk of disability from normal pregnancy did not
constitute discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. 38 Specifically, the Court noted that even though only
women can become pregnant, the exclusion of pregnancy from
39
disability-benefits coverage was not discrimination based on sex.
The Court reaffirmed the logic of the Gedulig holding in General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert (Gilbert).4 ° In Gilbert, the Court held that an
employer's failure to cover pregnancy-related disabilities under its
disability benefits plan did not violate Title VII absent any
indication that the exclusion of pregnancy disability benefits was a
pretext for discriminating against women. 4 1 The Supreme Court's
decision rejected EEOC guidelines and the unanimous conclusion
of all six federal courts of appeals that had addressed the issue 42 on
35. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
36. Reuter, supra note 21, at 1375.
37. Phillips,400 U.S. at 544.
38. 417 U.S. 484, 497 n.20 (1974) ("The California insurance program does
not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely
removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable
disabilities.").
39. Id. at 496-97 n.20 ("While it is true that only women can become
pregnant it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning
pregnancy is a sex-based classification....").
40. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976) (stating that
"Gedulig leaves no doubt that our reason for rejecting appellee's equal
protection claim in that case was that the exclusion of pregnancy from coverage
under California's disability-benefits plan was not in itself discrimination based
on sex.").
41. Id. at 136 ("Gedulig is precisely on point in its holding that an exclusion
of pregnancy from a disability-benefits plan providing general coverage is not a
gender-based discrimination at all.").
42. Id. at 146-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Commc'ns Workers v.
Am. Tel. & Tel., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on jurisdictionalgrounds, 424 U.S. 737
(1976); Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975); Tyler v.
Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1097-99 (5th Cir. 1975); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co.,

2009]

PRESCRIPTIONDRUG COVERA GE

211

the grounds that General Electric's policy covered the same
illnesses and conditions for both men and women. According to
the Gilbert majority, an employer need not go beyond this facial
parity to provide greater benefits to women simply because "their
differing roles in the scheme of human existence" implicate
additional health risks.4 3
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented in Gilbert, noting that
"although all mutually contractible risks are covered irrespective of
gender" under the health plan at issue, "the plan also insures risks
such as prostatectomies, vasectomies, and circumcisions that are
specific to the reproductive system of men and for which there
exist no female counterparts covered by the plan" and that
"pregnancy affords the only disability, sex-specific or otherwise,
that is excluded from coverage." 44 Justice Brennan further opined
that it is discriminatory for a company to adopt "a policy that, but
for pregnancy, offers protection for all risks, even those that are
'unique to' men or heavily male dominated. '45 Justice Stevens
wrote a separate dissenting opinion emphasizing that "the rule at
issue places the risk of absence caused by pregnancy in a class by
itself' and that, by definition, "such a rule discriminates on account
of sex; for it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily
differentiates the female from the male. ' 46 The logical
underpinnings of the Gilbert dissents provided the foundation for
subsequent congressional revisions to Title VII through the PDA.47
B. Redefining Protection:The PregnancyDiscriminationAct
Congress amended Title VII in 1978 to include the PDA.48
Drafted as a legislative restoration of the proper meaning of Title
VII after the Supreme Court's Gilbert holding, the PDA clarified
49
that the exclusion of pregnancy benefits violated Title VII.
Indeed, a House Report supporting the PDA expressed the view
"that the dissenting justices [in Gilbert] correctly interpreted the

522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975); Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist. No. 7, 519
F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975)).
43. Id. at 134 n.17.
44. Id. at 152 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. Id.at 160.
46. Id.at 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. H.R. REP. No. 95-948 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4750-51.
48. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, Oct. 31, 1978, 92
Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)).
49. H.R. REP. No. 95-948 (1978).
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Act.",50 Specifically, the PDA amended Title VII by adding the
following language to the definitions section of the statute:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex"
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so
51
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work ....
The PDA significantly altered judicial treatment of pregnancyrelated discrimination cases. In its first decision construing the
PDA amendment-Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co.
v. EEOC (Newport News)-the Supreme Court found that an
insurance plan that covered pregnancy-related costs for female
employees, but not for the spouses of male employees, violated
Title VII as amended by the PDA. 52 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court recognized that "Congress, by enacting the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, not only overturned the specific holding" in
Gilbertthat the exclusion of disabilities caused by pregnancy from
an employer's disability plan did not constitute discrimination
based on sex, but also "rejected the test of discrimination
employed by the Court" that differential treatment of pregnancy is
not gender-based discrimination because only women can become
pregnant. 53 Recognizing the broad remedial purpose of the PDA,
the Court noted: "The 1978 Act makes clear that it is
discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related conditions less favorably
than other medical conditions." 4 Accordingly, the Newport News
50. Id. at 2.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006). The PDA does not require an employer to
pay for health insurance benefits for abortion; however, the PDA provides
exceptions where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were
carried to term or where medical complications have arisen from an abortion.
See id. The statute also does not preclude an employer from providing abortion
benefits or otherwise affect bargaining agreements in regard to abortion. Id.
52. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,

676 (1983).

53. See id. at 676, 684 ("Although Gilbert concluded that an otherwise
inclusive plan that singled out pregnancy-related benefits for exclusion was
nondiscriminatory on its face, because only women can become pregnant,
Congress has unequivocally rejected that reasoning.").
54. Id. at 684 (holding that an employer health plan providing female
employees with hospitalization benefits for pregnancy-related conditions but
offering less extensive pregnancy benefits for spouses of male employees
discriminated against male employees and violated the PDA).
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Court made clear that discrimination based on pregnancy is, on its
face, discrimination because of sex. 5
In its second decision construing the 1978 amendment, the
Court explained that the PDA does not limit protection only to
women who are already pregnant. 56 In InternationalUnion, UA W
v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (Johnson Controls), a 1991 decision, the
Court held that the PDA forbids sex-specific fetal protection
57
policies that prohibit women from performing certain jobs.
Female employees challenged Johnson Controls' policy that barred
all women, except those whose infertility was medically
documented, from jobs involving actual or potential lead exposure
out of concern for the health of any potential fetus. 58 The Court
held that Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy "explicitly
discriminates against women on the basis of their sex" because the
policy "excludes women with childbearing capacity from leadexposed Jobs and so creates a facial classification based on
gender."5 9 The Court explained that the PDA "bolster[s]" this
conclusion by making classifications based upon pregnanc
explicit sex discrimination for purposes of Title VII. %
Accordingly, the Court concluded that a policy that classifies
employees by their "potential
61 for pregnancy" must be regarded as
explicit sex discrimination.
II. EMPLOYER HEALTH PLAN CONTRACEPTION EXCLUSIONS AND
TITLE VII

In spite of this Supreme Court precedent, courts currently
disagree about whether excluding prescription contraceptives from
an otherwise inclusive employer-provided health plan violates
Title VII, as amended by the PDA. Employers generally are free to
determine what health insurance benefits, if any, they offer to
55. Id. ("The Pregnancy Discrimination Act has now made clear that, for
all Title VII purposes, discrimination based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its
face, discrimination because of her sex.").
56. See Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for
Contraception, 73 WASH. L. REv. 363, 378 (1998).
57. See Int'l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 187
(1991); see generally Stephen F. Befort, BFOQ Revisited: Johnson Controls
Halts the Expansion of the Defense to IntentionalSex Discrimination,52 OHIO
ST. L.J. 5 (1991).
58. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 192.
59. Id at 197 (noting that "[f]ertile men, but not fertile women, are given a
choice as to whether they wish to risk their reproductive health for a particular job.").
60. Id. at 198.
61. Id. at 199 ("Under the PDA, such a classification must be regarded, for
Title VII purposes, in the same light as explicit sex discrimination.").
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employees. 62 Nevertheless, once an employer establishes an
employer-sponsored health plan, Title VII forbids discrimination in
the provision of such benefits on the basis of gender. 63 Thus, courts
must evaluate whether employer health plans that provide
comprehensive medical care (including coverage for preventive
prescription drugs used only by males), but fail to cover
prescription contraceptives used by women, constitute such
discrimination. 64 To explore the legality of contraceptive omissions
in employer-provided health plans, Subpart A examines the court's
reasoning in Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., the earliest federal case
to consider the issue of contraceptive exclusion under the PDA.
Next, Subpart B reviews the contrary holding of the Eighth
Circuit's recent opinion in Union Pacific. Finally, -Subparts C and
D analyze the issues raised in these two decisions and conclude by
encouraging other courts to adopt the reasoning offered by Judge
Bye in his Union Pacific dissent.
A. Recognizing CongressionalPurpose: Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co.
As discussed above, Jennifer Erickson sued her employer,
Bartell Drug Company, arguing that the selective exclusion of
prescription contraceptives from an otherwise comprehensive
65
prescription plan constituted discrimination on the basis of sex.
Washington state law mandates that employers cover prescription
contraceptives. 66 But Erickson could not sue under state law
because ERISA preempts state regulation of self-insured employer
plans, like that sponsored by Bartell.67 ERISA does not, however,
preempt federal antidiscrimination laws, 68 and thus Erickson
sought recovery under Title VII, as amended by the PDA.69

62. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1191 (2006).
63. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669, 682 (1983).
64. Cf In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936,
945 (8th Cir. 2007) (Bye, J., dissenting).
65. See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268 (W.D.
Wash. 2001).

66. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-43-822(2)(a) (2009) ("Health plans
providing generally comprehensive coverage of prescription drugs and/or
prescription devices shall not exclude prescription contraceptives or cover
prescription contraceptives on a less favorable basis than other covered

prescription drugs and prescription devices.").
67. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006); e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 727 (1985).
68. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (2006).
69. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1268.
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In 2001, Judge Lasnik of the Western District of Washington
held that because the Bartell Drug Company's self-insured
employer health plan generally covered most prescription drugs
and preventive medications but specifically excluded prescription
contraceptives used by women for birth control purposes, it
discriminated on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII. 70 Faced

with an issue of first impression for the federal courts, Judge
Lasnik examined the legislative history of Title VII, stating that
"the goal of Title VII was to end years of discrimination in
employment and to place all men and women... on equal footing
in how they were treated in the workforce." 71 Next, the court
analyzed the legislative purpose of the PDA, noting that the intent
of the amendments was to overturn the Supreme Court's holding in
Gilbert.72 Specifically, the Erickson court held that in enacting the
PDA, "Congress embraced the [Gilbert] dissent's broader
interpretation of Title VII which not only recognized that there are
sex-based differences between men and women employees, but
also required employers to provide women-only benefits or
otherwise incur additional expenses on behalf of women in order to
treat the sexes the same." 3 Rooted in the "legal principles
established by Gilbert and its legislative reversal," the Erickson
court held that discrimination based on any sex-based
characteristic is sex discrimination, and thus the employer's
exclusion of prescription contraceptives violated Title VII. M
Significantly, the Erickson court relied on the Gilbert dissents,
the post-PDA Supreme Court decisions in Newport News and
Johnson Controls, and the legislative objectives of Title VII in
crafting its decision. Erickson also referenced an EEOC policy
decision that held the PDA's prohibition of discrimination based
on "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions" includes
pregnancy prevention methods and applies to fringe benefit
plans.76 Relying on these purposive sources, the Erickson court
held that the PDA requires employers to provide equally
comprehensive health care coverage, even if that means providing
70. See id.at 1276-77 (noting that "Bartell's prescription drug plan
discriminates against Bartell's female employees by providing less complete
coverage than that offered to male employees").
71. Id.at 1269.
72. Id. at 1270.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.at 1277.
76. Id. at 1275-76 (noting that the "enforcing agency's overall
interpretation of Title VII comports with this Court's construction of the Act and
led the Commission to the same conclusion reached by this Court").
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additional benefits to cover women-only expenses. 77 Following the
Erickson decision, other federal courts agreed that the failure to
insure prescription contraceptives discriminates on the basis of sex
under Title VII. 78 Until the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue, only
two unpublished federal
79 district court opinions had rejected the
Erickson court's logic.
B. ParsingStatutory Text: The Eighth Circuit'sUnion Pacific
Decision
The Union Pacific Railroad Company, a freight company
headquartered in Omaha, Nebraska, sponsored a collectivelybargained health insurance plan that only covered contraceptives
when medically necessary for non-contraception purposes.80
Brandi Standridge and Kenya Phillips, two of approximately 1,500
female employees of childbearing age employed by Union Pacific,
used prescription contraceptives for contraception purposes and
were forced to pay out of pocket for the costs of their birth control
pills. 8 1 Named as representatives in a class action against Union
Pacific, Standridge and Phillips alleged that Union Pacific's failure
to provide prescription contraceptives-which exist only for
female as82opposed to male use-violated Title VII, as amended by
the PDA. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that their employer's
health plans violated Title VII because, although Union Pacific
covered no contraceptives to prevent the medical effects of
pregnancy, the plans paid for a variety of other prescription drugs
and preventive medical treatments-such as blood pressure
77. Id. at 1277.
78. See Stocking v. AT&T Co., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1016-17 (W.D. Mo.
2006) (holding that the PDA requires coverage of contraception); In re Union
Pac. R.R., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Neb. 2005) (holding that an employee
health plan that excluded contraception violated the PDA); Cooley v. Daimler
Chrysler Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 979 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (supporting the EEOC
opinion that failure to cover contraceptives raises both disparate treatment and
disparate impact claims). See also Bapat, supra note 12, at 956.
79. See Cummins v. Illinois, No. 02-4201, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42634,
(S.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2005) (holding that excluding contraception does not violate
the PDA); Alexander v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 02-252, 2002 WL 731815, at *4
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2002) (holding that PDA does not require providing
contraception). See also Bapat, supra note 12, at 956.
80. In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 938
(8th Cir. 2007) (noting that the plan may cover contraceptives when used for
treating skin problems or avoiding serious health risks associated with
pregnancy).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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medication to prevent heart disease. 83 The Union Pacific plans also
covered drugs used exclusively by males
84 to treat erectile
dysfunction and benign prostatic hypertrophy.
1. The DistrictCourt Held That Union Pacific Violated Title VII
The Nebraska federal district court compared the extent to
which the Union Pacific plan covered these sex-specific preventive
health treatments and granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment. 85 As discussed by the district court, the PDA forbids
discrimination not only on the basis of pregnancy but also on the
basis of "related medical conditions" and against "women affected
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." 86 Relying
on Johnson Controls,87 the district court noted that the PDA
protects non-pregnant women as well as pregnant women and held
that classifications
based on childbearing capacity constitute sex
88
discrimination.
Importantly, the district court recognized the medical
distinctiveness of contraception when it found that health plans
that "deny coverage for fertility treatments or for sterilizationmay
apply equally to men and women, and not violate Title VII," but
health plans that "deny coverage for contraception,by definition,
affect only the health of women." 89 The district court emphasized
that only women experience the medical effects of pregnancy 90 and
concluded that Union Pacific's policy of excluding prescription
contraceptives violated Title VII, because it treated the medical
care women need to prevent pregnancy "less favorably than it
treat[ed] medical care needed to prevent other medical conditions
that are no greater threat to employees' health than is
pregnancy." 91 The Eighth Circuit rejected this logic.

83. In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 378 F. Supp. 2d
1139, 1141 (D. Neb. 2005).
84. Id.
85. Id.at 1140.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006); In re Union Pac.R.R., 378 F.Supp. 2d at

1143.
87. Int'l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 187 (1991).
88. In re Union Pac. R.R.., 378 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.

89. Id.
at 1145.
90. Id.at 1147-48 (describing, in detail, the medical impact of pregnancy
by offering a "sex-neutral hypothetical in an attempt to bridge the gender gap-inattitude toward the prevention and treatment of illness").
91. Id.at 1149.
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2. The Eighth Circuit Overrules on the Basis That
ContraceptionIs "Gender-Neutral"
In reversing and remanding, Judge Gruender, joined by Judge
Bowman, held that contraception was not "related to" pregnancy
for PDA purposes because it was used before pregnancy, and
therefore the PDA did not even apply. 92 The court relied on Krauel
v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center,93 an earlier Eighth Circuit
opinion that held the PDA does not extend to fertility treatments.94
The court in Krauel concluded that the PDA's coverage of "related
medical conditions" extends only to medical "conditions"
associated with "'pregnancy' and 'childbirth.' 95 Holding that
contraception similarly is not "related to" pregnancy for PDA
purposes, the Union Pacific majority noted that, like infertility
treatments, "contraception is a treatment that is only indicated
prior to pregnancy., 96 According to the court, because
contraception is used to prevent pregnancy, it is not "related to"
pregnancy 7 and does not come within the PDA's zone of
coverage. The majority opinion found further support for this
interpretation from the fact that the plain language of the statute
does not mention "contraception" and likely signals
98 that Congress
did not intend for the PDA to apply in this context.
The Eighth Circuit distinguished Johnson Controls, noting that
Johnson Controls does not expand the PDA to cover fertility
matters before conception, 99 even though the Supreme Court held
in that case that the employer violated Title VII when it excluded
women with childbearing capacity from certain jobs.'00 Bound by
the Johnson Controls precedent, the Union Pacific majority made a
nuanced distinction that "contraception" is not a gender-specific
term like "potential pregnancy," because
contraceptive devices
101
may be used by both men and women.
Turning to the non-PDA Title VII issue, the Union Pacific
majority rejected the district court's "medical effects" basis for

92. In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 942
(8th Cir. 2007).
93. 95 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 1996).
94. In re Union Pac. R.R., 479 F.3d at 941.
95. Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679.
96. In re Union Pac. R.R., 479 F.3d at 942 (emphasis added).

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 941.
See Int'l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
In re Union Pac. R.R., 479 F.3d at 942.
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comparison. 102 Rather than comparing Union Pacific's coverage of
contraceptives to its coverage of preventive treatments for less
risky medical conditions,' °3 the Eighth Circuit instead identified
the relevant comparison as that concerning the plan's coverage for
contraception. 104 Finding that since Union Pacific's plan did not
cover any contraceptive methods for women or men, the coverage
for women was not less favorable and thus did not violate Title
VII. 0 5 In other words, since the plans did not cover birth control
pills for women or condoms for men, the coverage was equally
exclusive.
3. Judge Bye's Union Pacific Dissent
Judge Bye authored a dissenting opinion that disagreed with
the majority's reasoning on each issue. First, Judge Bye contended
that Congress intended the PDA to cover pre-pregnancy
discrimination, including discrimination in the coverage of
prescription contraceptives. 06 Title VII, as amended by the PDA,
prohibits discrimination "because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions."'10 7 Judge Bye noted that
the phrase "related medical conditions" indicates that the PDA
covers more than pregnancy alone. 10 8 He also pointed out that
when the PDA was being considered by Congress, Representative
Ronald Sarasin explained that the PDA protects a woman's right
"to be financialy and legally protected before, during, and after
her pregnancy.
Judge Bye also disagreed that the Krauel decision, which held
that infertility treatment is not a medical condition related to
pregnancy or childbirth," 0 necessarily limits the PDA to postconception conditions. Instead, he cited Supreme Court precedent
finding that "potential pregnancy" is a sex-related medical

102. Id. at 944.
103. See In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 378 F. Supp. 2d
1139, 1147-49 (D. Neb. 2005) (comparing health risks).
104. In re Union Pac. R.R., 479 F.3d at 944. See also Recent Case, supra
note 14, at 1449.
105. In re Union Pac. R.R., 479 F.3d at 944-45.
106. Id. at 946 (Bye, J., dissenting).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006) (emphasis added).
108. In re Union Pac. R.R., 479 F.3d at 946 (Bye, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (citing 124 CONG. REC. 38574 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (statement of
Rep. Sarasin, a manager of the House version of the PDA)).
110. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679-80 (8th Cir.
1996).

220

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 70

condition."' In Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court held that
classifying employees on the basis of childbearing capacity,
whether or not they were already pregnant, "must be regarded, for
Title VII purI oses, in the same light as explicit sex
discrimination."
In addition, Judge Bye distinguished Krauel by
maintaining that "prescription contraception and infertility
treatments are like apples and oranges.""13 In Judge Bye's view,
although infertility treatment may be gender-neutral because it
affects both men and women, contraception treatment is
necessarily sex-specific because it prevents pregnancy only in
women.
As to the second issue, Judge Bye agreed with the district court
that the proper comparison is not in the plan's narrow treatment of
prescription contraceptives but in the plan's broader preventable
health coverage provided to each gender. 115 In making this
comparison, Judge Bye particularly focused on the overall medical
effect of plan coverage, stating:
When one looks at the medical effect of Union Pacific's
failure to provide insurance coverage for prescription
contraception, the inequality of coverage is clear. This
failure only medically affects females, as they bear all of the
health consequences of unplanned pregnancies. An
insurance policy providing comprehensive coverage for
preventative medical care, including coverage for
preventative prescription drugs used exclusively by males,
but fails to cover prescription contraception used exclusively
116
by females, can hardly be called equal. It just isn't so.
Summoning the rationale of the Gilbert dissenters, Judge Bye
concluded that "to be equal, a plan would have to cover for the
uniquely female risk of pregnancy, although this 'required
giving
17
women additional benefits men would not receive.",
111. In re Union Pac. R.R., 479 F.3d 936, 947 (8th Cir. 2007) (Bye, J.,
dissenting). Notably, the Krauel court also recognized that potential pregnancy
is a medical condition that is sex-related because only women can become
pregnant. See Krauel, 95 F.3d at 680.
112. See Int'l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199
(1991).
113. In re Union Pac.R.R., 479 F.3d at 948 (Bye, J., dissenting).
114. Id. ("Once pregnant, only the woman's health is affected. Infertility, by
contrast, is a word used to describe a number of medical conditions affecting
both men and women.").
115. Id. at 948-49.
116. Id. at 945 (citation omitted).
117. Id. at 949 (Bye, J., dissenting). Judge Bye also notes it is unsurprising
that Union Pacific's plan does not cover non-prescription male contraceptives
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C. Analysis
As the Erickson and Union Pacific decisions illustrate, the
exclusion of prescription contraceptives from an employersponsored health insurance plan that generally covers preventative
prescription drugs implicates two principal legal issues. The first
issue concerns whether contraception is a pregnancy-related
condition for purposes of the PDA. If that question is answered in
the affirmative, then any plan distinctions based on contraception
are per se distinctions based on sex. 11 8 The second question asks
whether such a plan impermissibly treats males and females on an
unequal basis. While the appropriate resolution of these two
questions is a close call, Judge Bye's dissenting opinion provides a
desirable road map for evaluating gender equity in prescription
drug coverage.
1. Applicability of the PDA to Contraception
The Eighth Circuit in Union Pacific held that contraception is
not "related to" pregnancy for PDA purposes because
"contraception is a treatment that is only indicated prior to
pregnancy."'1 19 In effect, the Union Pacific majority endorsed its
earlier ruling in Krauel, which concluded that the PDA's coverage
of "related medical conditions" extends only to medical
"conditions" associated with "'pregnancy' and 'childbirth.""12 0
The Eighth Circuit's ruling on this issue is misguided for
several reasons. First, this ruling does not fit easily with the plain
text of the PDA. Congress amended Title VII through the PDA to
prohibit discrimination "because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions."'12 1 The first clause of the
PDA specifically states that "[t]he terms 'because of sex' or 'on
the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of or on
the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions."' 22 The broad phrase, "include, but are not limited to,"

because few health insurance policies cover devices available over the counter
in drug stores and gas stations across the country. Id.
118. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669, 684 (1983); H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 2 (1978).
119. In re Union Pac. R.R., 479 F.3d at 942 (emphasis added).
120. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679 (1996).
121. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006) (emphasis
added).
122. Id. (emphasis added); see In re Union Pac. R.R., 479 F.3d at 946 (Bye,
J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Certain Members of the Congress as Amici
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indicates that Congress was not creating an exclusive list but rather
was illustrating examples of covered conditions. 23 The second
clause of the PDA similarly extends coverage to "women affected
124
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions."
Congress, in using the terms "related to" and "affected by," clearly
intended coverage of conditions beyond those limited solely to
pregnancy and childbirth.
In addition, contraception is "related" to pregnancy in the
ordinary sense in which those terms are understood. 25 The term
"relation" is defined as "a logical or natural association between
two or more things."'' 26 The specific purpose of contraception is to
prevent unwanted pregnancies. 27 In fact, without contraception,
the average woman is likely to become pregnant twelve to fifteen
times over the course of her life.' 28 Contraception, therefore, is
logically associated with or "related" to the risk of pregnancy-a
sex-specific health condition.
A broad reading of the PDA's plain text also is supported by
the PDA's legislative history. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Bye
correctly recognized that the legislative purpose of the PDA
requires a comparison of a health care plan's sex-specific benefits,
including pre-pregnancy benefits.' 2 9 When the PDA was being
considered by Congress, Representative Ronald Sarasin explained
that the PDA is intended to protect a woman's right "to be
financially and legally protected before, during, and after her
pregnancy."' 130 A House Committee Report similarly stated, "[i]n
using the broad phrase 'women affected by pregnancy, childbirth
Curiae Supporting Appellee, In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig.,
479 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1706)).
123. In re Union Pac. R.R., 479 F.3d at 946 (Bye, J., dissenting) ("[T]he term
'including' is not one of all-embracing definition, but connotes simply an
illustrative application of the general principle." (citing Fed. Land Bank of St.
Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 (1941))).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006) (emphasis added); see also In re Union
Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1143 (D. Neb.
2005) (relying on the second clause to hold that the PDA requires Union Pacific
to treat the risk of pregnancy no less favorably then other similar health risks).
125. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1152 (3d ed. 1993)
("related" is defined as "1. Connected; associated. 2. Connected by kinship,
marriage, or common origin. 3. Having a specified harmonic connection").
126. Id.
127. In re Union Pac. R.R., 479 F.3d at 938.
128. In re Union Pac. R.R., 378 F. Supp. 2d at 1146.
129. See In re Union Pac. R.R., 479 F.3d at 945-46 (Bye, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 946 (emphasis added) (citing 124 CONG. REC. 38574 (daily ed.
Oct. 14, 1978) (statement of Rep. Sarasin, a manager of the House version of the
PDA)).
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and related medical conditions,' the bill makes clear that its
whole range of matters concerning the
protection extends to the
3
childbearing process."' '
Most significantly, the Eighth Circuit's logic troublingly
abandoned the Supreme Court's holding in Johnson Controls
32
which applied PDA protection to pre-pregnancy discrimination.
Inthat decision, the Court expressly stated that adverse treatment
based on a female worker's "potential prepancy" is a sex-related
medical condition covered by the PDA.' The Eighth Circuit's
ruling that the PDA applies only in a post-conception context is
simply inconsistent with Johnson Controls' more expansive
"potential pregnancy" application.
A 2008 decision of the Seventh Circuit made this point with
considerable emphasis. In Hall v. Nalco Co., an employee claimed
that her employer violated the PDA by discharging her due to
absences resulting from time spent undergoing -in vitro fertilization
treatment. 1 34 The employer argued that the PDA was inapposite
because the PDA does not apply to pre-conception matters such as
infertility.' 35 The Seventh Circuit, however, explained that the
Court in Johnson Controls invalidated classifications based on
gender and "childbearing capacity."' 136 More particularly, the
Seventh Circuit held that "Johnson Controls specificallyforecloses
the argument that the PDA applies only post conception."' 13 7 The
court decisions
Hall court went on to cite numerous circuit
8
applying the PDA in pre-conception settings.13
Finally, even if the Eighth Circuit's reliance on its earlier
Krauel decision can somehow be squared with the seemingly
broader temporal reach of Johnson Controls, it is not clear that
Krauel's treatment of fertility should be extended to the realm of
contraception. As Judge Bye cogently explained, while infertility
treatment may be deemed gender-neutral because it can affect both
sexmen and women, contraception treatment is necessarily
139
specific because it prevents pregnancy only in women.
131. H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 5 (1978).
132. See Int'l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
133. Id.at 198.
134. Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 2008).
135. Id.at648n.1.
136. Id.at 648 (citing Johnson Controls,499 U.S. at 198).
137. Id.at 648 n.1 (emphasis added).
138. See Griffin v. Sisters of St. Francis, 489 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2007);
Kocak v. Cmty. Health Partners of Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 470 (6th Cir.
2005); Walsh v. Nat'l Computer Sys., Inc., 332 F.3d 1150, 1160 (8th Cir. 2003).
139. In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 948
(Bye, J., dissenting).
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Thus, the plain language of the PDA, its legislative history, and
Supreme Court precedent all suggest that the PDA should be read
to encompass conception as a pregnancy-related condition. As
such, the Supreme Court's Newport News decision instructs that
discrimination based on contraception
is, on its face,
40
discrimination because of sex. 1
2. The Title VII DisparateTreatment Comparison
The Eighth Circuit determined that the appropriate comparison
for Title VII purposes is to gauge the respective access of men and
women to the specific benefit in question. 14 ' Accordingly, the
court found no disparate treatment in Union Pacific's health plan
because the plan provided the same lack of coverage for
contraception purposes to employees of both genders. 142
Here again, Judge Bye's dissent more appropriately conforms
to Title VII doctrine by considering the broader medical effect of
Union Pacific's failure to cover prescription contraceptives as the
143
proper framework for examining the discrimination inquiry.
This approach finds support in the roots of PDA legislative history,
existing Supreme Court precedent, and the practical impact of the
PDA.
Although both men and women could use different forms of
contraceptives to prevent pregnancy, prescription contraceptives
are available only to women and only women experience the
medical impact of pregnancy. 1 4 The Eighth Circuit abandoned the
legislative intent underlying the PDA-to prohibit covering male
employees' sex-specific health needs more extensively than the
sex-specific health needs of women-when it held that Union
Pacific's plan did not violate Title VII even though the plan
covered male-specific treatments
but excluded prescription
145
contraceptives for women.
The facial parity logic adopted by the Union Pacific majority
effectively resurrects the discredited analysis employed in Gilbert.
In both cases, the errant majorities ruled that a plan's failure to
cover pregnancy-related health care risks treats both genders

140. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669, 684 (1983); H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 2 (1978).
141. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
142. See supranote 105 and accompanying text.
143. See In re Union Pac. R.R., 479 F.3d at 945 (Bye, J., dissenting).
144. See Phillips, supranote 33, at 345-46.
145. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 159 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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equally, despite that such risks are borne only by women. 146 What
may appear to be facial parity on the surface, in effect, fails to treat
sex-specific risks, as well as overall health risks, equally in
practice.
Congress repudiated the facial parity analysis of Gilbert
through the adoption of the PDA. As the pertinent legislative
history demonstrates, Congress affirmatively adopted the Gilbert
dissenters' views in terms of the appropriate health risk
comparison. 147 A House Report on the PDA expressly stated that
"[i]t is the committee's view that the dissenting justices correctly
interpreted the Act."' 148 In a similar fashion, a Senate Report quoted
the Gilbert dissents and stated that they
149 "correctly express both the
principle and meaning of Title VII."' '
The Supreme Court's decision in Newport News also endorsed
the perspectives of the Gilbert dissenters. In that decision, the
Court explained that Congress, in enacting the PDA, both rejected
the Gilbert result and endorsed
the reasoning and interpretation of
150
the dissenting opinions.
Thus, Congress specifically adopted the reasoning of the
Gilbert dissenters that courts must compare the health benefits
generally made available to male and female employees, including
those benefits that relate to sex-specific health needs.' 5 ' As Justice
Brennan's dissent in Gilbert opined, General Electric's plan was
discriminatory because it "devised a policy that, but for pregnancy,
offer[ed] protection for all risks even those that are 'unique to'
men or heavily male dominated. '' 152 To Justice Brennan, a plan that
covers the sex-specific health needs of male employees more
generously than the corresponding sex-specific health needs of
female employees runs afoul of Title VII. 5 3 Accordingly, the
views of the Gilbert dissenters require a broad-based comparison
of total health needs rather than a formal parity that narrowly
focuses on the denial
15 of coverage for just one particular sexspecific health need. 4
146. See Phillips, supra note 33, at 342.
147. See id.
at 332-33; Recent Case, supra note 14, at 1451.
148. H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 2 (1978), as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.

4749,4750.
149. S. REP. No. 95-331, at 2-3 (1977).
150. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669, 676-77 (1983).
151. See H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 2; Recent Case, supra note 14, at 1450-53.
152. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 160 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
153. See id.
154. See Recent Case, supra note 14, at 1450-51.
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Judge Bye's dissenting opinion in Union Pacific is faithful to
the view of the Gilbert dissenters. His solution, similar to Justice
Brennan's, is to compare the overall medical effect of the
employer's plan on both men and women. 55 This approach
appropriately compares plan coverage of all sex-specific
treatments rather than focusing exclusively on coverage for one
particular need, i.e., contraception. 156 In Union Pacific, the health
plan provided comprehensive coverage for preventative medical
care, including prescription drugs that benefit the sex-specific
needs of males.'1' But the Union Pacific plan excluded coverage
for prescription contraceptives, even though such contraceptives
are available only for women, and only women can become
pregnant. 158 Such a plan does not provide equal medical benefits
and should not pass muster under Title VII.
3. Additional Policy Considerations
Title VII is a remedial civil rights statute that should be
liberally construed. 159 Accordingly, a construction affording
female employees broad access to prescription contraceptives
should be favored.
More specifically, a key policy objective of Title VII is to
eliminate barriers that inhibit equal opportunities for women and
minorities in the workplace. 160 The Eighth Circuit's Union Pacific
decision is inconsistent with this goal. Women confronted with less
generous health care coverage will experience diminished
employment options. 16 As Representative Hawkins noted in
arguing in favor of the PDA, discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy "is one of the chief ways in which women's careers
155. In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 945
(Bye, J., dissenting).
156. See Recent Case, supra note 14, at 1452.
157. See supranotes 83-84 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
159. See Allen v. Entergy Corp., Inc., 193 F.3d 1010, 1020 (8th Cir. 1999).
160. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) ('The
objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII ... was to achieve equality of
opportunity and remove barriers . . . [with respect to previously disfavored
groups]."); see generally Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights, and the Quest for
Equality of Opportunity. A CriticalLegal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295
(1988).
161. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992)
("The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of
the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive
lives."); Law, supra note 56, at 364-68 (1998) (describing the social and
economic effects of unintended pregnancies).
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have been impeded
' 62 and women employees treated like second
employees.'
class
Nearly one-half of all pregnancies in the United States are
unintended.' 63 Financial barriers to accessing contraceptives mean
that many women face difficulties in balancing their work and
family roles. '6 Unplanned pregnancies, in addition, exacerbate
traditional perceptions that women are less dedicated and reliable
workers than their male counterparts. 165 In short, the equitable
treatment of prescription contraceptives in employer-sponsored
health plans will enhance the equitable treatment of women in the
workplace.
D. Conclusion
Courts should embrace the reasoning of Judge Bye's dissent in
Union Pacific in addressing the issue of prescription contraceptive
exclusions from employer-sponsored health plans. Given the
predominant role that such plans play in underwriting the health
risks of American women,' 6 this step will have the salutary effect
of enhancing access to prescription contraceptives and reducing the
number of unintended pregnancies. But a second strategy is needed
as well because Title VII's reach is limited. Two limitations are
particularly noteworthy. First, Title VII applies only to employers
with fifteen or more employees. 167 Second, Title VII only regulates
health plans that are directly provided by employers.168 Since Title
VII prohibits only discrimination by employers, it does not regulate
69
health benefits that are purchased from an insurance company.1
162.
163.

123 CONG. REC. H10582 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1977).
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &

PREVENTION,

FERTILITY,

FAMILY

PLANNING AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH OF U.S. WOMEN: DATA FROM THE 2002
NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 59 (2005); see also GUTrMACHER INST.,
NEXT STEPS FOR AMERICA'S FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAM: LEVERAGING THE
POTENTIAL OF MEDICAID AND TITLE X IN AN EVOLVING HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 4

(2009) (noting that about half of U.S. pregnancies-more than three million per
year-are unintended), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/NextSteps.pdf.
164. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 158 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (" . . . [P]regnancy exclusions built into disability programs both
financially burden women workers and act to break down the continuity of the
employment relationship, thereby exacerbating women's comparatively
transient role in the labor force.").
165. See Phillips, supra note 33, at 348.
166. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
167. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006).
168. See Sharona Hoffman, AIDS Caps, Contraceptive Coverage, and the
Law: An Analysis of the FederalAnti-DiscriminationStatutes' Applicability to
Health Insurance,23 CARDOzO L. REV. 1315, 1348 (2002).
169. Id.
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As discussed in the next Part, statutorily-mandated benefit
coverage offers an additional means of expanding coverage for
prescription contraceptives.
III. MANDATED HEALTH BENEFIT LAWS

Mandated benefit laws are frequently discussed as health care
reform tools, but they reflect a tension between keeping costs low
versus spreading the risk of loss as widely as possible.' 70 An
additional concern is whether such mandates should be adopted at
the state or federal level. Many states currently mandate coverage
of prescription contraceptives.' 7 1 However, ERISA generally
immunizes self-insured employers from these state mandates such
that they apply only to benefit plans that are purchased from
insurance companies. 172 In terms of a federal alternative, as early
as 1997,17 and nearly every year since, 74 members of Congress
have introduced amendments to ERISA that would require all
group health plan providers and group health plan insurance
issuers to cover prescription contraceptives if the plan provides
coverage for other prescription medicines and devices. 175
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of mandated benefit
coverage, Subpart A examines existing state laws requiring
contraception coverage. Next, Subpart B considers the
appropriateness of federally mandated health benefit laws and
analyzes the most recently proposed contraceptive equity
amendments to ERISA. Ultimately determining that federal benefit
regulation is both appropriate and preferable, Subpart B concludes
by advocating for comprehensive federal regulation to improve
access to reproductive health care.

170. Amy B. Monahan, Value-Based MandatedHealth Benefits, 80 U. COLO.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id=1244674.
171. See Kuhn, supra note 4, at 356 (noting that over the past decade many
state legislatures have taken action to mandate coverage of prescription
contraception by employer-related health plans).
172. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471
U.S. 724, 732 (1985); see also Bapat, supra note 12, at 954.
173. See S. 743, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 766, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 2174,
105th Cong. (1997).
174. See H.R. 463, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 21, lllth Cong. (2009); H.R.
2412, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 3068, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 4651, 109th
Cong. (2005); S. 1214, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 2727, 108th Cong. (2003); S.
1396, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1111, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 104, 107th Cong.
(2001); H.R. 2120, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 1200, 106th Cong. (1999).
175. Kuhn, supra note 4, at 364 (describing proposed legislation).
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A. State Statutes
At least twenty-three states currently mandate equal coverage
of prescription contraceptives. 176 None of these laws, however,
apply to employers who pay for health care claims with their own
funds because self-funded plans are regulated by ERISA, which
broadly preempts state law.' 77 In contrast, ERISA's "insurance
savings clause" authorizes states to regulate the business 1of
78
insurance as an exception to ERISA's broad preemptive effect.
As a result, state mandates apply to employer plans that purchase
insurance but not to plans that employers provide directly and fund
out of their own assets. 7 9 The exclusion of self-funded plans from
state regulation is quite significant since such plans account for
fifty-four percent of all beneficiaries covered by employersponsored health plans. 80 Thus, although state mandated
contraception coverage may provide relief for some working
women, the limited scope of these state laws leaves many women
without coverage. 81
176. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-1057.08A(1), 20-1402L(1), 202329A(1) (2002 & Supp. 2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-1103(a) (West Supp.
2009); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196 (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a530e (West 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3559 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 3324-59.6(c) (West 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 431:1OA-116.6, 432:1-604.5
(LexisNexis 2004); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/356z.4 (West 2008); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 514C.19 (West 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2332-J(1)
(2000 & Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A §§ 2847-G(1), 4247(1) (2000
& Supp. 2008); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826 (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 175, § 47W(a)-(b); ch. 176A § 8W(a)-(b); ch. 176B § 4W(a)-(b), ch.
176G, § 40(a)-(b) (West 2007 & Supp. 2008); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.1199(1)(4)
(West 2002 & Supp. 2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 689A.0415, 698A.0415,
689B.0376 (West 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 415:18-i, 420-A:17-c, 420B:8-gg (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-22-42 (West 2003); N.Y. INS. LAW §
3221(l)(16) (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-178 (West
2000 & Supp. 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-20-43(a), 27-41-59(a) (2002); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4099c(a) (2001); WASH. ADMIN. CODE 284-43-822(2)(a)
(2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§33-16E-4(a-b) (West Supp. 2008); see also Kuhn,
supra note 4, at 356-57.
177. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006); Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 732;
see also Bapat, supranote 12, at 954.
178. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2006).
179. See Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 732.
180. See Amy B. Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free
Market? An Examination of MandatedHealth Benefit Reform, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1361, 1373 (2007) [hereinafter Monahan, Mandated Health Benefit

Reform].

181. See, e.g., Katie Ervin Carlson, Note, A Study of the Effectiveness of
MandatedState ContraceptiveCoverage in Iowa and Missouri and the Casefor
a FederalLaw, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 509, 524-26 (noting that despite its statemandated contraceptive coverage, Iowa has experienced an increase in
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These state laws contain varying coverage requirements. For
instance, some laws mandate coverage of "any" or "all"
contraceptive drugs and devices approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). 182 Other laws mandate coverage of FDAapproved contraceptive drugs and devices but do not contain the
words "any" or "all."' 183 Still another law merely prohibits the
exclusion of FDA-approved contraceptives.' 84 Most, but not all,
state laws contain conscience clauses exempting coverage for
religious employers or insurers. 185 These state mandate laws,
accordingly, provide a regulatory regime that is far from uniform.
As a possible remedy to insufficient coverage, Congress could
repeal the ERISA preemption provision, thereby granting states
complete regulation of health care. 186 Exclusive state regulation of
health insurance, however, would create enormous inefficiencies
because multi-state employers would have to comply with up to
fifty different sets of health plan regulations. 187 Positive federal
regulation mandating benefit
1 88coverage for ERISA plans may be a
more appropriate approach.

abortions, likely because most of the women obtaining abortions were not
covered by plans subject to the state law).
182. See GA. CODE ANN. §33-24-59.6(c) (West 2005); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24-A, § 2756 (2000 & Supp. 2008); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826, 829
(West 2002); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.1199(1)(4) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §415:18-i (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4099c(a)
(2001); see also Breena M. Roos, Note, The Questfor Equality: Comprehensive
Insurance Coverage of Prescription Contraceptives, 82 B.U. L. REv. 1289,
1298-1301 (2002) (summarizing the available scope of coverage under various
state laws).
183. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3559 (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 176B, § 4W(b) (West 2007 & Supp. 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A22-42 (West 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-178 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007);
Roos, supra note 182, at 1299 n.95 (listing all laws that mandate coverage of
FDA-approved contraceptives but lack the words "any" or "all").
184. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-503e (2001).
185. See Roos, supra note 182, at 1301 (noting that fifteen states grant some
form of religious exemption). For a detailed discussion about using religious
conscience clauses in contraception equity legislation, see Staci D. Lowell,
Note, Striking a Balance: Finding a Placefor Religious Conscience Clauses in
ContraceptiveEquity Legislation, 52 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 441 (2005).
186. See Monahan, Mandated Health Benefit Reform, supra note 180, at
1375-76.
187. See id.at 1375; Stephen F. Befort & Christopher J. Kopka, The Sounds
of Silence: The LibertarianEthos of ERISA Preemption, 52 FLA. L. REv. 1, 39
(2000).
188. Cf Monahan, Mandated Health Benefit Reform, supra note 180, at
1388-1401 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of increasing substantive
federal health care regulation generally, ultimately advocating that federal
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B. ProposedFederalAmendments
For over ten years, versions of the proposed contraceptive
equity legislation (EPICC) were stalled in Congress.18 9 As recently
as January 2009, the EPICC was again introduced to amend
ERISA by prohibiting group health plans and health insurance
issuers from excluding or restricting benefits for prescription
contraceptives if such plans provide benefits for other prescription
drugs.'19° Consideration of this bill is increasingly urgent after the
Eighth Circuit's failure to use Title VII as a tool to remedy genderbased benefit disparities. 19 1 An amendment to ERISA, of course,
does not provide a universal solution to the matter of prescription
contraceptives since it does not apply to individuals who are
92
unemployed or otherwise not covered by a group health plan.'
But the EPICC would importantly fill many of the coverage gaps
currently created by various state mandates and offer another
potential remedy for eradicating sex discrimination in employee
health plans. To evaluate the desirability of enacting the EPICC,
this Subpart will first examine the appropriateness of amending
ERISA in light of federalism concerns before then analyzing the
substance and impact of the pending EPICC bill.
1. FederalismConcerns
States historically played a principal role in the regulation of
health care and insurance. 193 The 1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act

regulation has significant advantages over the status quo and represents the best
way forward for mandated benefit reform).
189. See H.R. 463, lllth Cong. § 201-04 (2009); S. 21, lllth Cong. § 20104 (2009); H.R. 4651, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 1214, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.
2727, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 1396, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1111, 107th
Cong. (2001); S. 104, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2120, 106th Cong. (1999); S.
1200, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2174, 105th Cong. (997); S. 766, 105th Cong.
(1997); S. 743, 105th Cong. (1997).
190. See S. 21, 111th Cong. §§ 201-04 (2009); H.R. 463, 111th Cong. §§
201-04 (2009).
191. See generally In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 479
F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2007).
192. See Kuhn, supra note 4, at 367-72 (arguing that the EPICC amendments
to ERISA would not help those in greatest need of prescription contraception,
including poor, young, uninsured women).
193. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985)
(noting that the states "traditionally have had great latitude" to legislate as to the
"protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons"
(quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 62 (1873))).
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provides explicit authority to the states to regulate the business of
insurance. 194 Passed in response to a 1944 Supreme Court decision
195
that recognized insurance as an element of interstate commerce,
the McCarran-Ferguson Act grants states broad powers to regulate
insurance.196 State authority remains subject to federal override,
however, as Congress specifically reserved the right to supersede
state law. 197 Congress retains the ability to regulate insurance so
long as it explicitly states that
the legislation is intended to apply to
98
the business of insurance.'
ERISA did not initially dictate the specific benefits that group
health plans were required to provide but left such substantive
regulation to the states. 199 Congress, however, has amended the
Act in recent years to include limited substantive requirements for
200
group health plans, similar to state mandated benefit laws.
Examples of recent federal legislation include the Newborns' and
Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996201 and the Mental Health
Parity Act of 2006.202 Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that the
federal government has played an "increasingly
significant role in
20 3
the protection of the health of our people."
While many states have enacted mandated benefit laws
requiring health insurance plans to include substantive coverage
provisions,20 4 the competing standards that these state laws impose
may create undesirable inefficiencies and result in reduced benefits
for employees. 20 5 To avoid the detrimental costs associated with
diverse regulatory standards, many scholars debating possible
194. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2006).
195. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533,
541-46, 553 (1944).
196. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006).
197. Id.
198. Id. ("No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless
such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance.. .

.").

The McCarran-

Ferguson Act likely would not bar the application of EPICC, if enacted, from
overriding state insurance regulations. See Kuhn, supranote 4, at 366.
199. See Monahan, Mandated Health Benefit Reform, supra note 180, at
1371.
200. See id.
201. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (2006).
202. See 29 U.S.C. § 1185 (2006).
203. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (referencing the
federal statutes regulating food and drug safety).
204. See Monahan, MandatedHealth Benefit Reform, supra note 180, at 1365.
205. See id.at 1389-91 (stating that ERISA preemption of self-insured plans
coupled with jurisdictional competition among the states results in a multiplicity
of benefit standards).

2009]

PRESCRIPTIONDR UG CO VERA GE

233

remedies for the nation's broken health care system advocate for
regulation at the federal level as well as federal preemption of state
regulation whenever Congress mandates substantive health
provisions. 206 Such an approach is consistent with the notion that
ERISA was designed to provide a uniform regulatory scheme for
employers by preempting state laws that "relate to" any employee
benefit plan. (0
A significant normative consideration also favors regulation at
the federal level. As Amy Monahan has explained, "the outcomes
of our current system of health insurance regulation turn on a
morally arbitrary distinction-a distinction based solely on how a
health plan is funded. 2 °8 Thus, state regulation may govern
insured health plans while federal law preempts such regulation
with respect to self-funded plans. 20 9 Regulation by means of
federal law can overcome this irrational distinction by bringing
both plan types under the same regulatory umbrella.
2. ProposedContraceptiveEquity Legislation 2009
The proposed EPICC would provide a federal mandate for
prescription contraceptive coverage in otherwise comprehensive
health plans. More specifically, the language of the pending bill
provides:
A group health plan, and a health insurance issuer
providing health insurance coverage in connection with a
group health plan, may not(1) exclude or restrict benefits for prescription contraceptive
drugs or devices approved by the Food and Drug
Administration, or generic equivalents approved as
substitutable by the Food and Drug Administration, if such
plan or coverage provides benefits
for other outpatient
21
prescription drugs or devices ....0
206. See, e.g., id.at 1389 (premising arguments for federal regulation on the
assumption that because of the undesirability of two possible levels of regulation,
Congress would "specifically act to preempt states' authority to regulate the
substance of health insurance contracts"); Hoffman, supra note 168, at 1362
(urging the adoption of a federally based national health benefits package).
207. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006) (noting that ERISA "shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan"); see also Befort & Kopka, supra note 187, at 35
(contending that ERISA preemption "was designed to create a uniform body of
federal law regulating employee benefits").
208. Monahan, MandatedHealth Benefit Reform, supra note 180, at 1397.
209. See supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
210. S. 21, 111 th Cong. § 715(a)(1) (2009).
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Significantly, this mandate would extend to both "a group
health plan" and to "a health plan issuer," thereby covering both
self-insured and insured health care plans. The EPICC,
accordingly, would create a uniform mandate and overcome the
"irrational distinction" of treating these two plan types in an
inconsistent fashion.
As currently drafted, the proposed EPICC would amend
ERISA to set a federal floor of protections concerning prescription
contraceptives while allowing states to set yet higher standards.21 '
In other words, the EPICC would not preempt more demanding
state laws that may require more expansive benefit coverage for
employees.212 This approach is similar to that of the Newborns and
Mothers' Health Protection Act, which does not preempt stricter
state laws that provide at least the minimum coverage mandated by
the federal Act.213
Rather than saving stricter state laws from preemption and
creating a patchwork of federal and state insurance regulations for
contraceptive coverage, the EPICC should be altered to create a
universal benefit mandate that preempts such state laws altogether,
thereby avoiding
a multiplicity of divergent contraceptive
214
mandates. Federal mandates offer a more efficient and effective
21
means of achieving uniform and comprehensive coverage. 5
Although changing the preemption provision would eliminate the
opportunity for state innovation that is protected in the current
EPICC bill, offering a uniform standard will reduce compliance
costs for health plans and therefore likely increase support for the
bill.
Parties opposed to mandated contraceptive coverage are likely
to argue that the EPICC legislation will have the perverse effect of
encouraging employers to eliminate prescription drug plans
altogether. Rather than assuming the additional cost of covering
prescription contraceptives, employers may stop sponsoring health
plans at all or reduce benefits broadly to avoid accusations of
inequality. 216 In other words, federally mandated contraceptive
coverage may create a "race to the bottom" in which employers
craft equally exclusionary health plans.
211. See S. 2.1, 111th Cong. §§ 715(e), 2708(e) (2009).
212. See id.
213. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(f) (2006).
214. Lynda A. Rizzo, The Equity in Prescription Insurance and
Contraceptive CoverageAct: Will Congress Heed the Wake-Up Call of Erickson
v. Bartell Drug Company?, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 261-64 (criticizing state

contraceptive mandates as ineffective).
215. See Monahan, MandatedHealth Benefit Reform, supra note 180, at 1389.
216. See Hoffman, supra note 168, at 1359; Kuhn, supra note 4, at 366.
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While the EPICC may create some additional expenses for
existing comprehensive plans that currently exclude contraceptives
from covered benefits, the price of covering birth control pills is
minimal compared to the cost of childbirth. It is estimated that
health plans save between $9,000 and $14,000 per woman when
contraception is used to avoid an unintended pregnancy. 2 17 The
financial costs of childbirth are much greater than the costs of even
many years of prescription contraceptives. 218 Unintended
pregnancies are more likely to involve increased health risks, and
when a pregnancy results in a distressed newborn or causes injury
to the mother, the medical costs are even greater than with healthy
childbirth. 219 Accordingly, employers have a financial incentive to
cover prescription birth control treatment for female employees.
On balance, the adoption of a federal law mandating the
inclusion of prescription contraceptives in otherwise comprehensive
group health plans serves positive policy objectives. Coupled with
full preemption of state regulation, such legislation also would
further efficiency and normative goals. Congress should quickly
enact such a modified version of the EPICC proposal.
CONCLUSION

Unwanted pregnancies pose a public health concern because of
increased medical risks for mothers and newborns. 220 The United
States has one of the highest rates of unintended pregnancies
among industrialized nations.221 Contraceptives are effective in
preventing unintended pregnancy, and increased access to them
importantly mitigates the adverse social consequences of unwanted
pregnancies. 222 As a matter of policy, ensuring equal health care
coverage also is an important step towards eliminating genderbased discrimination in the workplace.
217. See James Trussell et al., The Economic Value of Contraception: A
Comparisonof 15 Methods, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 494, 494-503 (1995).
218. See Law, supra note 56, at 366 (comparing the costs of specific
prescription contraceptive options to the medical costs of childbirth). Employerprovided health plans are already required to cover the cost of childbirth. See
Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4;
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006); Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
219. See Law, supra note 56, at 366.
220. See S. 21, 111 th Cong. § 2 (2009) (noting that each year, nearly half of
all pregnancies in the U.S. are unintended, and nearly half of unintended
pregnancies end in abortion).
221. Id.
222. Id.
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A twofold approach to contraceptive equity regulation that
couples a proper interpretation of Title VII with federal benefit
mandates offers the most comprehensive solution for eliminating
sex-based discrimination in employer health plans. Providing equal
coverage of prescription contraceptives importantly reduces sexbased discrimination in the workplace-a significant public policy
concern enshrined in Title VII and the PDA. Courts, accordingly,
should draw from Judge Bye's Union Pacific dissent to invalidate
the exclusion of prescription contraceptives from otherwise
comprehensive health care plans. Meanwhile, Congress also
should act swiftly to pass the EPICC with a revised preemption
clause to create uniform standards requiring all comprehensive
health plans to offer contraceptive coverage. In tandem, these steps
will both remedy gender discrimination and diminish the adverse
health, social, and economic consequences resulting from
unintended pregnancies.

